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116 HOWALDT V. SUPERIOR COURT. [18 C. (2d) 
The record does not indicate whether the decedent, Fritz 
Benthien, or his heirs residing in the German Reich, were or 
are German "nationals" within the meaning of the treaty 
prOVISIOns. rrhe respondents cite decisions (see In re Muckl's 
Estate, 174 Misc. 35 [19 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 1009] ; In re Ram-
berg's Estate, 174 Misc. 306 [20 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 619]; 
In re Weidberg's Estate, 172 Misc. 524 [15 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 
252] ), to the effect that the function of the court sitting in 
probate is to see that the decedent's property is distributed 
in accordance with the intent expressed in the will, or in 
accordance with the laws of succession, and to make appro-
priate regulations to that end if necessary (see, also, Prob. 
Code, sec. 530), even to the extent of directing that prop-
erty be withheld for the time being if existing conditions so 
require. 
[1] However, the appealability of the order sought to be 
annulled disposes of the present proceeding. Before 1935 it 
was recognized that an order instructing or directing an 
executor or administrator was not an appealable order be-
cause such an order was not specified in section 1240 of the 
Probate Code. (In re Emerson's Estate, 139 Cal. App. 571 
[34 Pac. (2d) 800].) In 1935 (Stats. 1935, p. 1972), the 
legislature amended that section by including therein as an 
appealable order an order" instructing or directing an execu-
tor or administrator." With the exception that an appeal 
will lie from an order granting or denying amotion for a 
new trial in those proceedings in probate in which the mo-
tion is proper, the rule is that an appeal does not lie from 
an order made after final judgment in pro bate proceedings. 
(Estate of O'Dea, 15 Cal. (2d) 637 [104 Pac. (2d) 368]; 
Lilienkamp v. Superior Oourt, 14 Cal. (2d) 293 [93 Pac. (2d) 
1008] ; Estate of Grussing, 15 Cal. App. (2d) 11 [59 Pac. 
(2d) 152].) The reason for the rule was stated to be that 
such an order was not made expressly appealable by section 
1240 of the Probate Code. Adherence to the rule is de-
pendent upon whether the order is one not included in section 
1240 as an appealable order. Since the order in question 
is one directing the administrator, it is an order specified 
in said section as an appealable order and· must be so con-
sidered for the purpose of the. present matter. [2] A pro-
ceeding in review in this state will not lie if the order sought 
to be reviewed is an appealable order. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 
June,1941.] JENTICK V. PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. Co. 117 
1068.) "Certiorari cannot be made a substitute for an ap-
peal." (Erickson v. Municipal Court, 219 Cal. 737 [29 Pac. 
(2d) 192]; Ivory v. Superior Court, 12 CaL (2d) 455 [85 
Pac. (2d) 894], and cases cited.· . 
The proceeding is dismissed. 
Curtis, J.,Traynor, J., Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and 
Carter, J., concurred. 
[So F. No. 16525. In Bank.-June 18, 1941.] 
JOSEPH JENTICK et al., Respondents, v. PACIFIC GAS 
AND ELECTRIC. COMPANY (a Corporation), Appel-
lant. 
[1] Master and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Findings, 
Verdict-Acquittal of Employee.-Where an employer's lia-
bility for negligence rests upon the principle of respondeat 
superior, a verdict exonerating the employee exonerates the 
employer. 
[2a, 2b] Appeal-Review-Persons Entitled to Alleged Errors-
Error Committed or Invited-Finnings, Verdict.-Under the 
doctrine of "invited error," a master may not complain on 
appeal of a verdict against him which exonerates the em-
ployee where the verdict resulted from an erroneous instruc-
tion given at his request or an erroneous instruction in sub-
stantially the same language as the request. 
[8] Id.-Determination-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instruc-
tions-Conflicting Instructions.-While questionable and in-
complete instructions may be rendered im.lOcuous if it is 
clear, when they are read and considered with other instruc-
tions, that the jury was not misled, the error in a misleading 
or incomplete instruction is not removed by correct instruc-
tions when the record clearly indicates that the jury was 
confused and followed the erroneous instruction in reaching 
its verdict. 
2. See 2 Cal. Jur. 848; 3 Am. Jur. 427. 
3. See 2 Cal. Jur. 1027; 3 Am. Jur. 632. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Master and 'Servant, § 217; 2. Ap-
peal and Error, § 1096; 3. Appeal and Error, § 1641; 4. Appeal 
and Error, § 1095; 5. Appeal and Error, § 1090. 
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[4] Id.-Review-Persons Entitled to Alleged Errors-Error Com-
mitted or Invited-Instructions.-Complete identity of the 
instruction requested and that given is not essential to the 
doctrine of invited error, it being sufficient if the two are 
substantially the same in meaning. 
[5] Id.-Review-Persons Entitled to Alleged Errors-Error Com-
mitted or Invited-Good Faith as Factor.-The doctrine of 
"invited error" is applicable irrespective of the good faith of 
the appellant. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Maurice T. Dooling, 
Jr., Judge Presiding. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained as re-
sult of a gas explosion predicated upon negligence in street 
excavation work. Judgment for plaintiffs against certain 
defendants, affirmed as to the appellant public utility cor-
poration. 
Thos. J. Straub, W. H. Spaulding and John J. Briare for 
Appellant. . 
Francis Gill, John Langer and Glikbarg, Wolf & Selig for 
Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The city of San Francisco awarded a con-
tract for the widening of a section of Nineteenth Avenue to 
Charles Harney. In performing the work, Harney's em-
ployees ripped up the pavement with a scarifier and removed 
the broken fragments . with a steam shovel. 'The Pacific Gas 
alid Electric Company maintained pipes and conduits in the 
avenue for the supply of gas to abutting residences. 
Throughout the project the Pacific Gas and Electric Gom-
pany's employees, including Alvin Parkhurst and John Mc-
Grath, marked the location of pipes on the surface of the 
street, laid temporary surface mains, excavated certain pipes, 
and made connections or disconnections as the situation re-
quired. . These operations were performed under the direction 
of Frank English, the· company superintendent of construc-
tion. 
After scarifying the street surface adjacent to· the premises 
at 1563 Nineteenth Avenue, the scoop of the steam shovel 
while removing a load of broken pavement, caught and bent a 
·June, 1941.] J ENTICK V. PACIFIC GAS & ELEc. Co. 
[18 c. (2d) 117] 
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feeder pipe maintained by the Pacific Gas and Electric Com-
:pany for the supply of gas to those premises. Employees of 
the company immediately examined the pipe but discovered no 
.leak or break. Some fifteen minutes later, however, a gas 
explosion occurred within the basement of 1563 Nineteenth 
Avenue, iIijuring plaintiffs Jentick and Austin who were 
standing on the sidewalk in front of the premises. A subse-
quent examination revealed that the shovel in catching and 
bending the feeder pipe had torn it loose from the riser pipe 
serving these premises. Escaping gas from this break 
caused the explosion. 
Plaintiffs brought suit against Harney, the Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company, English, Parkhurst, .and McGrath, charg-
ing them in general terms with negligence. At the conclu-
sion of the trial the court granted a motion for a directed 
verdict in favor of defendant McGrath. After being fully 
instructed by the court on the law applicable· to the case, the 
jury returned verdicts of $2,000 and $4,000 in favor of plain-
tiffs Jentick and Austin respectively against defendant Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company and of $1 each against defendants 
English and Parkhurst. Defendant Harney was held not 
liable. The trial court pointed out to the jury that its ver-
dicts were inconsistent because it could not impose a lesser 
liability upon English and Parkhurst than upon the other 
defendant after having found them all negligent. The mem:-
bers of the jury thereupon stated that they were confused as 
to whether· or not they could find a verdict in favor of 
English and Parkhurst and against the Pacific Gas and Elec,. 
tric Company. At this point counsel for the defendant .gas 
company stated to the court: "If the court please, I think the 
difficulty the jury is having is whether or not they must find 
a. verdict against Parkhurst and English in order to. find it 
verdict against the Pacific· Gas and Electric Company and J 
think that should be made clear to them, that they don 't hav~ 
to find it against the individuaL" The court then again in~ 
structed the jury that the Pacific Gas and·Electric Company 
could be held liable under the doctrine of roespondeat superio~ 
only if English and Parkhurst as employees were found tQ 
be negligent and held equally liable, but that if the Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company were found to have been negli~ 
gent independently of the acts of English and. Parkhurst; 
it could be held liable and English and· Parkhurst exonerated. 
". .• • '.! 
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. if they were found not to have been negligent. A short time 
after the jurors received this instruction and just as they 
were about to retire once more to the jury room, the counsel 
for the defendant gas· company made the following request 
to the court: "Now, before the jury is sent back, I would 
like to ask the court to instruct the jury that it is not neces-
sary to find a verdict against the individuals Parkhurst and 
English in order to render a verdict against the defendant 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company." Whereupon the court 
stated: "I will so instruct the jury at the request of Mr. 
Briare, that they need not return a verdict against either 
of the personal defendants in order to render a verdict against 
the Pacific Gas and Electric Company." The jury then 
went out and within five minutes returned with a verdict 
holding the Pacific Gas and Electric Company liable for 
damages to plaintiffs J entick and Austin in the amount of 
$2,000 and $4,000 respectively and exonerating defendants 
English and Parkhurst entirely. The Pacific Gas and Elec-
tric Company has appealed from this judgment after denial 
of its motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, and a new trial. 
[1] Defendant contends it is entitled to judgment in its 
favor because there is no evidence of negligence on its part 
independent of the acts of its employees, English and Park-
·hurst, and since its liability as employer depends upon the 
existence of negligent conduct by them, the verdict of the 
jury finding them free from negligence ex'Onerates it from 
liability. Where an employer's liability for negligence rests 
upon the principle of respondeat superior, it is well estab-
'Jished that a verdict exonerating the employee exonerates 
the employer. (Bradley v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420 [97 Pac.~ 
875, 129 Am. St. Rep. 171].) In the present case, however, 
the inconsistent verdicts in favor of the employees and 
against the employer resulted from the erroneous instruction 
givento the jury just before it retired that" ... they need not 
return a verdict against either of the personal defendants in 
order to render a verdict against the Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company. " This instruction led the jury to believe that it 
could properly hold the Pacific Gas and Electric c.ompany 
for the conduct of English and Parkhurst and at the same 
time acquit those employees of liability. It immediately re-
turned with a verdict releasing the employees and holding 
the employer after having previously brought in a verdict 
June,1941.] JENTICK V. PACIFIC GAS & ELEc. Co. 
[18 O. (2d) 117] 
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finding the employees guilty of negligence and after having 
expressed doubt as to whether the employees could be exoner-
ated from liability and the employer held liable for damages. 
The inconsistent verdicts clearly resulted from an erroneous 
instruction given to the jury at the request of the counsel for 
defendant. 
[2a] Under the doctrine of "invited erroOr" a party can-
not successfully take advantage of error committed by the 
court at his request. Thus, on appeal a litigant cannot object 
to the admission of incompetent evidence offered by him. 
(See cases cited in 2 Cal. JUl'. 848.) He cannot complain of 
error in instructions requested by him. (Gray v. Ellis, 164 
Cal. 481 [129 Pac. 791]; Walsh v. Standart, 174 Cal. 807 
[164 Pac. 795] ; Rigall v. Lewis, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 737, 738' 
[37 Pac. (2d) 97].) Nor can he challenge a finding of the 
trial court made at his instance. (Snow Mountain Water & 
Power Co. v. Kraner, 191 Cal. 312 [216 Pac. 589] ; McCann 
v. Children's Home Society of California, 176 Cal. 359 [168 
Pac. 355].) In the present case, therefore, defendant cannot 
attack a verdict resulting from an erroneous instruction which 
it prompted. (Benoit v. Perkins, 79 N. H. 11 [104 Atl. 254] ; 
Frascone v. Louderback et al., 153 App. Div. 199 [138 N. Y. 
Supp. 370].) 
Defendant contends that the instruction is not erro-
neous when read with the prior and correct instruction. The 
prior instruction informed the jury that the employees could 
be exonerated and the employer held liable if the latter were 
independently negligent in some respect. Defendant main-
tains that the jury's verdict was based upon a finding of such 
independent negligence, but denies that there was sufficient 
evidence to support such a verdict. [3] Questionable and in-
complete instructions may be rendered innocuous if it is 
clear, when they are read and considered with the other in-
structions, that the jury was not misled. (James v. Frazee, 
209 Cal. 456 [288 Pac. 784] ; Hurtado v. San Diego Elec. Ry. 
Co., 204 CaL 446 [268 Pac. 620].) The error in a misleading 
or incomplete instruction, however, is not removed by other 
correct instructions when, as in the present case, the record 
clearly indicates that the jury was confused on the matter 
covered by the instruction and followed the erroneous in-
struction in reaching its verdict. 
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[2b, 4] Defendant claims that the instruction given differs 
materially from the one requested and that it therefore did. 
not invite the error. There is, however, no essential difference 
between the two instructions. The requested instruction was 
that the jury n~~<;l not hold ." the individuals English and 
Parkhurst ... ". The court's instruction was that the jury 
need not hold "either of the personal defendants . . . ". 
Complete identity of the two instructions is not essential to 
an application of the principle of invited error. The error 
is invited jf the'two are substantially the same in meaning. 
(Yolo Water & Power 00. v. Hudson, 182 Cal. 48 [186 Pac. 
772] ; Ohase v. Southern Pac. 00., 119 Cal. App. 341 [6 Pac. 
(2d) 540].) 
[5] Defendant may not avoid the application of the doc-
trine by asserting that the errQr was not deliberately or wil-
fully induced. The good faith of defendant is immaterial. It 
is incumbent upon counsel to propose instructions that do 
not mislead a jury into bringing i!.l an improper verdict. 
Whether deliberate or not, defendant's action was responsible 
for the erroneous instruction and verdict. Defendant must 
therefore accept them as ~o;rrect. 
The judgment is affirmed~ 
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., Edmonds, J., and Gib-
son, C. J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 17, 
194L 
June, 1941.] WINDER V. WINDER. 123 
[I •. A. No. 17855. In Bank.-June 19, 1941.] 
JEROME E. WINDER, Respondent, v. JOHN R. WINDER, 
as Executor, etc., Appellant. 
[1] Decedents' Estates-Claims-Allowance-:.Who may Allow-
Co-executor.-Under Prob. Code, § 570, a claim of one of two 
executors is properly presented to his co-executor, who is 
not disqualified, and if rejected, an action thereon will lie. 
Compliance with Prob. Code, § 703, providing for presentation 
to the judge, is not required. 
[2a,2b] Work and Labor-Evidence-Weight and Sufficiency.-A 
finding of a mother's contract to compensate a son for ser-
vices is supported by evidence showing that she induced him 
to continue to live with her upon her promise to leave prop-
erty to him, and that after his marriage he was induced to 
return home whereupon she reaffirmed the promise. 
[3] Id.-Effect of Express Contract-Where Contract is Invalid. 
When continuous personal services are performed under an 
express agreement for compensation upon termination thereof, 
which agreement is unenforceable because not in writing, the 
reasonable value of the services may be recovered. 
[4] Id. - Actions-Time to Sue-When Statute Commences to 
Run.-In case of an action for reasonable value 'of services· 
pursuant to an unenforceable contract for compe1\lsation upon 
the termination thereof, the statute of limitations does not 
eommence to run until the termination of the services, which 
is usually upon the death of the promisor. 
[5] Id.-Relationship of Parties-In General.-While the relation-
ship between·· the parties may repel the idea of a contract to 
compensate for personal services, in order to support a claim 
for services made by a child or relation who remains with 
his parent or kin after majority, the circumstances must show 
either an express contract or that compensation was in the 
contemplation of the parties. 
[6] Limitation of Actiol1S-Procedure~Appeal-Harmless Error 
---Failure to Find.-The failure specifically to find upon an 
1. See llA Cal. Jur. 772; lIB Cal. Jur. 315. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Decedents' Estates, § 513; 2. Work, 
Labor and Materials, § 42; 3. Work, Labor and Materials, § 17; 
4. Work, Labor and Materials, § 26; 5. Work, Labor and Mate-
rials, § 7; 6. Limitation of Actions, § 168; 7. Decedents' Estates, 
§ 543. . 
